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The rapid industrialization of Japan following 1869 has often
been termed the "Japanese miracle" because in the space of only four
decades JaDan rose from humble status to equality with the great
western powers. Other underdeveloped nations, both then and now,
have been confronted with the problem of quickly "catching up" to the
wealthy countries, but none seem to have achieved the spectacular
success of the Japanese. This work examines the role of Meiji
government financial policies in the achievement of that success.
The subjects addressed include: reform of the currency; creation of
the instruments of monetary policy; taxation and other revenue poli-
cies; fostering the growth of the stock of private capital; govern-
ment participation in manufacturing; policies on foreign trade and
foreign exchange. Analysis and criticism of various policies is
presented. Some guidelines for drawing implications about other
developing nations are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid modernization of Japan during the Meiji era has
been the subject of much discussion and admiration. Faced with
i commercial and military threats from superior nations, the Japanese
in less than five decades advanced close to parity with their
opponents. The Chinese, despite immensely better natural resources
than the Japanese, were not successful in meeting the western
challenge. Other developing nations today face some of the situations!I
the Jaoanese did during the Meiji period, and might perhaps draw
useful imformation from the Japanese experience.
This work examines the contribution of Meiii financial nolicInv
! both fiscal and monetary, to the overall economic victory. Many
other factors played a part as well, but the role of government
Sfinancial policy was large, and financial policy is one thing every
!developing nation can directly control. For each aspect of policy
i;discussed the historical facts are presented, together with analysis
iand criticism. Appropriate reference is made when the analysis is
from previous studies, while the author's own opinions are supported
with statistical information where such is available, The period
studied is from 1969, when the military action to consolidate Meiji I
i rule ended, to 1911, when Japan regained full tariff autonomy and
j! membership in the family of great nations.
ii
A summary of the contents of each chapter appears at its I
1 beginning, and the implications of the material discussed for the
overall economic development appears at the enrid of each chapter.
The method of procedure is as follows. The history of Japan
; is reviewed, with a view to establishing certain pertinent economic
and social conditions at the start of the Meiji period. The Meiji
1I worked with certain advantages that had developed naturally in
the social system. Monetary policy is then examined as a whole,
since:-citeation and maintenance of .a modern money structure was a
Dprior necessity to any fiscal policy. Fiscal policy was the
,igovernment's major contribution to the direction expansion would
I take, and allowed balanced growth of important sectors. Foreign
i trade policy is examined with a view to understanding how the
fJapanese managed to obtain so much foreign capital for expansion with-1
hout the foreign control such capital brought to China. Finally a
II
I!few guidelines for drawing conclusions about contemporary situations
jfrom the Japanese experience are discussed; the Meiji period was,
11after all, a hundred years ago and the world economy has changed.
i,
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1869
The family or clan structure has always been
.important in Japanese society. A clan-centered
national government began with the Taika reform
in 645 A.D. Subsequently Japan underwent a slow
transformation into a feudal society, simila:
in cause and form to Europe after Rome. The
deteriorization of centralized authority led
Sregional conflict and the ascendency of the
warrior class (Samurai) to power in their ow:
right. After 1185 the warring states were u
the greater or lesser control of a supreme
feudal lord called the Shogun. From 1683-18'
the Tokugawa clan controlled the shogunate.
Thinking that an unchanging socio-economic
system would provide lasting internal peace,
the Tokugawa enforced a rigid caste-type div
sion of society and an absolute ban on foreii
contact. This ban was forcibly ended by wes
nations in the 1850's. Decline of the shogui
followed rapidly. In 1867 the shogun abdica
and the emperor Meiji assumed actual control
the government. Rapid industrialization (ant
westernization) took place under the Meiji.
With the exception of the Ainu who populate the northern isl;
iof Hokkaido (and who were regarded as the aboriginal barbarians by
the rest of the population through most of Japanese history) the
Japanese are a Tungus people, akin to those who inhabit Manchuria
iKorea. Their language is polysylabic, and only resembles Chinese
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written form (which they borrowed from China).
Little other than myth is known of the history of ancient
Japanese society. The island is mentioned in several Chinese works,
but there are no detailed records. The earliest written histories
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iiappeared in the eith century A.D.: the Kojiki (Record of Ancient
iMatters) in 712, and the Nihongi (Chronicles of Japan) in 720. The
Jlsociety seems to have been ordered in a clan system, similar to many
I iother primitive societies. Asiatic, and especially Chinese, influence
I.was strong. Chinese writing was introduced via Korea in the fifth
century, and Buddhism came over from China in the next century.
Unlike the Chinese, who have always taken great pride in self-
sufficiency and regarded their land as the hub of the universe, the
Japanese have always been quick to recognize their own deficiencies
i;and have showed themselves adept at borrowing from other cultures to
quickly bridge gaps in their own development. This trend has contin -
i ued right up to the present time, and in some circles has branded the
Japanese as unoriginal. Original or not, the material and political
progress of Japan during these "borrowings" has been much greater than
her "original" neighbors. This kind of adaptability contributed much
Ito progress during the Meiji era.
The first central government structure was borrowed from China
II!1during the Taika reform of 645-650. At the time promising young men
of the various clans were sent to China to study. In 645 a group of
these students helped engineer a coup d'etat which clearly elevated
I.the Yamoto clan above its chief rival, the Soga, and made Yamoto the
I most important single clan in Japan. The Yamoto ruler styled himself
lemperor, and the clan set about a deliberate attempt to create a
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9H miniature replica of the contemporary T'ang dynasty in China. A
Chinese-style bureaucracy was set up, complete with imperial examina-
tions. There was no democracy; only aristocrats were eligible to
i! take the tests. The Yamoto group never actually ruled over more than
Ii
I a small part of Japan; other clans remained powerful. But the Yamoto
' were generally recognized as the legitimate symbol of Japanese
nationalism. This Was thea:positionof Atheiemperer. upto the Meiji
era: a monarch who does not actually rule on a day-to-day basis, but
!whom none dare rise above. Real power was always exerted indirectly,
Iby controlling the emperor, not overthrowing him.
A major aspect of the Taika reform was the concept that the
Semperor owned all the land, the clans surrendering it to him. This
i surrender was more formal than real. Various ranks of imperial
i officials were allowed estates of varying sizes, In China the gov-
ernment was always busy keeping tax-paying peasants from falling into
ithe hands of wealthy bureaucrats, whose influence protected them from
i1
ithe tax. In Japan there was no powerful civil service, only the
I'aristocrats, who, as provincial officials, joined with court nobles in
building up huge private estates from the "national" land. The Yamoto
!could not adequately check this tendency without endangering theiI
'I support which ensured their primacy.
Over the years Japanese society underwent a transformation very
Mimilar to n-v- ur +f+er +he l iA 1; -f R m + it + t
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and the power of the central government, never great, declined. The
S farther the central power declined the more the economy became
i warring-states Japan had developed,complete with a warrior class and
I a feudal structure similar to European feudalism. The emperor sur-
l vived as the powerless symbol of nationalism. There were various
i struggles of one court faction against another, using the warriors
0 In one such struggle, the Heiji Rebellion of 1159, the warriors
apparently became aware of their own power. Two warrior families,
the Taira and the Minamoto, having first gained prominence as de-
il fenders of rival court factions, decided to fight it out for power in
If their own right. Taira triumphed, but proceeded to rule in the manner
i of the nobility, and fell prey to all the influences undermining the
other noble groups. In 1185 the Taira were crushed in a sea battle,
i! and the leader of the Minamoto (Yoritomo) was appointed shogun
(sei-i-tai-shogun, "subduing barbarian great general", a title given
previously to commanders sent by the imperial government against the
I Ainu). From then until 1867 shogun signified a warrior-leader who had
been "given" power to rule the country by the emperor. Like the greatij
i mediaeval kings in Europe, the shogun's power was only as great as
Hl his control of his vassal states. For seven centuries the ruling
igroup was made up of warriors, with all the ascetii traditions
11
ii of the Samurai. When the Meiji period came, there were thus a large
jj number of Samurai among those educated enough to fill positions in
I the new government. These warriors were perhaps quicker to recognize
iU the inferiorities of their country before the westerners than were the
IChinese bureaucrats. The primary western pressure was military, and
i the Samurai saw that itircould- oly be met by constructing an economy
capable of producing western-style armaments. The Chinese did not
i fully perceive the gravity of their inferiority until the western tideIi
was too large to stop.
In 1543 three Portuguese sailors were shipwrecked in Japan.
They brought the first firearms seen in Japan. Shortly thereafter
i I Christian missionaries began to come to Japan. They made surprisingly
i large conversions in a short time, many of whom were ordered to "con-
f vert" by their warlords. Conversion was a convenient means of making
contact with the west, the source of weapons. Even while it was
spreading Christianity was being persecuted. The combination of
i internal economic difficulties and the strife of these persecutions
.1 resulted in the Shimabara rebellion of 1637-1638. After order was
restored the shogun decided to protect the new stability by closing
SJapan to all foreigners. The proscription was effectively enforced,
the only westerners being a few Dutch confined to Nagasaki. Also no
Japanese were allowed to leave the country.
During this same period of 1550-1650 Japan was unified politi-
12
jl cally and militarily by Nobunaga, then Hideyoshi, and finally
Tokugawa, Tokagawa Ieyasu believed that if he set up a system
designed to be unchanging it would last forever. The estates were
i redistributed in ways that prevented alliances. Hostages were kept
at court, and the feudal lords had to take turns attending court.
Society was legally stratified: the Samurai, the farmers, the artisans
N and the merchants - descending in that order. It became impossible
for anyone to move outside his class. Merchants, at the bottom,1
were despised. Nevertheless, as unification produced a national
•
economy, money and banking in rudimentary form developed. The pro-
scription of foreigners was just one more step in the process of
freezing society.
After about 1700 peasant riots began to be annoyingly frequent.
They arose from misadministration of the Tokugawa government, high
taxes, crop failures, etc. These eventually toppled the Tokugawa
regime.
iI
This was the situation when Japan was once again opened to the
west. Industrialization in Europe and the United States called for
new markets, as did the nineteenth-century vogue for colonialism.
Steamships required coaling stations around the world. Tales of
ii
cruel treatment of shipwrecked westerners by the Japanese increased
the feeling that something should be done about the situation.
In 1853 a fleet of American ships under Matthew Perry sailed
i •
i into Japanese waters with the express purpose of opening the country
I to westerners. Perry carried a letter from the President demanding
I coaling stations and the right to take on provisions. Frightened of
the obviously superior western military power, the Japanese signed
l such a treaty early in 1854. The door was open, and other nations
rapidly came too. In just a few years Japan was the victim of
f "unequal" treaties such as had been forced on China, including extra-
Hterritorial rights for the westerners. Anti-foreign riots occurred.
The Tokugawa government was damned as un-Japanese if it suppressed
, them, and damned by the powerful foreigners if it did not. Already
j faltering under internal economic pressures, the Tokugawa regime
slowly collapsed.
When the emperor Mutsuhito succeeded to the throne in 1867
I Keiki, the fifteenth and last Tokugawa shogun, resigned. For the
first time since the twelfth century the emperor, whose reign-name
iwas Meiji, assumed actual power. In 1869 a civil*war with the
iremaining Tokugawa supporters was ended, and the feudal lands were
:i surrendered. In 1871 the legal basis of both the clans and the
U caste structure were abolished. In 1871 state-controlled education
was inaugurated, and the next year universal conscription began.
IThe modernization of Japan proceeded with bewildering speed, both
1i politically and technologically. This change was spurred by the
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treaties. The adaptable Japanese built up western-style industry
in only a few decades, fought successful wars with China and Russia
which brought in huge indemnity payments, and by 1911 had regained
f complete tariff autonomy, the last step in throwing off the western
yoke. China, who had been victimized by the foreigners far earlier
!than Japan, was still their victim. The financial policies of thei i
h Meiji government played a substantial part in this success story,
iby fostering a balanced growth of agriculture, private capital,
and the government sector, and doing so without excessive resource
to foreign capital participation, which had been the undoing of China.1
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS AT THE START OF THE
MEIJI PERIOD
Tokugawa Japan was not a primitive society. The
agricultural economy supported 35 million people
many of whom were literate. Numerically the
population was static. The rigid social struc-
ture was being undermined by changing economic
conditions, especially the rise of the merchant
group and the anomalous position of the lower
samurai. These two groups had something to gair
from the change in government, and were the
basis for economic expansion. The practice of
sankin-kotai developed transport, communication,
and sophisticated commercial obligations. A
satisfactory source for capital formation could
be found in the agricultural sector, already
adjusted to heavy feudal dues. Changes in
farming techniques during the late Tokugawa era
preconditioned many people to working for wages
and the procedures of commerce,
When Perry came to Japan in 1853 the country must have seemed
very primitive to him. There were no western-scale industries. The
army was antiquated, and the navy non-existent. The Japanese know-
ledge of the world beyond their borders was slight. But nevertheless
I' Japan was not a primitive society; it was merely non-industrial in
western terms. Various social and economic forces were already at
work that facilitated the Meiji transformation.
The agricultural economy supported some 35 million people on
i less fertile land than Britain (1) which had only 7 million people at
(1) Maddison, Angus - Economic Growth in Japan and the USSR, p. 3
SNew York, Norton, 1969
i !i
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.the start of its industrial revolution. A substantial labor force i
I was available if they could be freed from farming. It is estimated
Sthat 40-50% of boys, 15% of girls received some formal education (2).
literal risk of their lives, managed to learn the language of the
Dutch at Nagasaki, and through them some facts about the west, Lit-
eracy was very important to the Meiji growth. Once people have
gained some degree of literacy they are usually more receptive to
i further teaching.
Numerically the population was static (3). The higher classes i
j practiced abortion, and the peasants infanticide (mabiki, literally
i "thinning"). Among the peasants this was usually a response to
p heavy feudal taxation (one less child for the family tax, one less
mouth to consume the peasant's share of the crop after the crop tax).
IIn the later Tokugawa era peasant reaction took more organized form:
riots and even mass armed rebellion.
At the top of the social structure was the shogun, an office
dominated by the Tokugawa family. Their domain covered about aj quarter of the country. Their source of revenue was the rice tribute
i paid by their feudal retainers, who in turn exacted it from the
iipeasants who lived in their domain. This rice tribute amounted to
i(2) Dore, C. - "The Legacy of Tokugawa Education", in Marius B.
Jansen ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes, Princeton, 1964, p. 105
i (3) Maddison, op cit, p. 6
i .
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I about 8 million koku out of total production of 28 million (4).
jThis was of considerable importance for Meiji financial policy: the
i economy was already adjusted to devoting a large percentage of GNP
to the government sector. The uses of these funds had to be re-
! directed.
Under the shogun were the daimyo, the feudal lords who ruled the
i various han (clan-states). There were 176 fudai daimyo, the "favored
jlords":ktho had always supported Tokugawa. High government positions
.were filled from their ranks alone. There were also 86 tozama
idaimyo, the "outside lords" who supported Tokugawa only after defeat
i in battle. They had no share in the Bakufu (shogunal government) and
11in turn were allowed a measure of autonomy within their han. The
1tozama included some of the wealthiest and most militarily powerful
Hilords, including Shimazu of Satsuma. Satsuma, in southern Kyushu,
iwas further protected by its great distance from centers of Bakufu
Spower. Its men even dared violate the ban on foreign relations by
1 trading with China. Through this and other doors knowledge of things
ii western leaked in even before Perry.
i The Bakufu discouraged intercourse between the han. Marriage
alliances required approval. Passports were required for travel
between han. Bakufu espionage was extensive, Perhaps the greatest
(4) Tsuchiya Takao, "An Economic History of Japan" in Transactions of
the Asiatic Society of Japan, 2nd series, v. 15, p, 223
1i If
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, economic impact came from the institution of sankin-kotai: all
daimyo were required to reside for a number of months each year at the
Ishogun's court in Edo, and to leave members of their family as hos-
Stages when they returned to their han. This had two effects. The
first was to develop transportation, commhnication, and more sophis-
ticated commercial (especially monetary) arrangements to adequately
!i -
H care for the daimyo during the substantial geographic movements
i required by the sankin-kotai. The second effect was to increase the
importance of, and daimyo dependence on, the officially-despised
merchant class. They were needed to manage estates during the
daimyo's absence, and to facilitate the vast movement of his entouragel
iduring the sankin-kotai.
The next group on the social ladder were the warriors or
samurai. Below them were farmers, then artisans, then merchants, and
jl finally outcasts called eta. During the dark ages of Japan (the
Ashikaga shogunate) the warriors did battle for their lords. But
under the lengthy peace of Tokugawa there was little fighting to do,
and their position became anomalous and parasitic. They were support-
ed by a grain stipend from their daimyo, who exacted the grain tax
from his peasants. Many lower samurai were little better off than
the peasants. The poverty and idleness of this large, educated
group, raised in a tradition of devotion to the state, discipline,
and full use of one's talents had important implications. The
_ _ --- -K-------- -i---
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samurai were among those who had time to learn Dutch. They had
I little reason to support the Tokugawa regime other than their feudal
l oath; they derived few benefits from it. Their traditions of
Ssacrifice and denial of individual interest gave them an ingrained
! aptitude for corporate effort. Their military outlook and lack of
iinterest in the status-quo helped them see that certain western ways
ihad to be imitated if the threat was to be met. In contrast the
i Chinese bureaucracy was made up of literati who had risen through the
imperial examinations, which centered on the Confucian classics.
i A change of Chinese structure and policy would have jeopardized their
iposition, and besides their background and hub-of-the-universe atti-
Stude prevented their perceiving the full extent of the foreign threat
!until it was too late. The Chinese attitude is typified by the
iresponse of the emperorC ienIT--U•-un-ti t the embas ofL,•• O  oru Maca;rtne
Sin 1793.
S "The stores of goods at the Celestial Court are plenteous and
abundant, so there is really no need for the produce of outer bar-
barians in order to balance supply and demand." (5)
S The most dramatic social change was the fusion of certain !
isamurai and merchant families. This was connected with the introdue-
ition of a money economy in the a~gricultural sector, where barter had
- Ja
! • oran EH.- paan's Emergence as a Modern State . p. 30
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940
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been the rule before. The expenditures of the daimyo were prin-
c ipally for luxury consumption items (after maintenance of their
samurai and estates) 'and he variety and quantity of such items
Ssteadily increased, under the Tokugawa peace. In the course of
iI keeping up to the standards of other great lords a daimyo's need for
i i
funds increased, and thus so did his exactions from his peasants.
The combination of sankin-kotai and the variety of (not-locally-
I produced) luxuries fostered a more sophisticated national economy
in place of the isolation of the feudal manor. This eventually brough
a money economy into rural areas; the daimyo could not carry tons of
rice with him to Edo. Not only did the lord begin to demand some of
II
H his dues in money, the peasant often had to pay money for supplies,
i especially after fertilizers were introduced. In years of bad
I harvests he had no choice but to turn to the moneylenders, who often
acquired land in this way. Thus land was held in fewer hands, tenancy
increased, and the merchants were brought into closer relations with
N samurai who inhabited the estates. As their own expenses rose and
their peasants became indebted, many daimyo themselves became in-
1idebted to the merchant class (chonin). As their importance in societyl
1 rose, many chonin were adopted into noble families, and many poor
il samurai were glad to marry into wealthy merchant families. So by
I1 the time of the Meiji a strong, experienced merchant group, often
fused with the devoted nationalism and fierce energy of the samurai,
_________ __________________ 
_____________
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was available, even if heavy industry and western financial institu-
tions were not.[, As shown, the agricultural sector was already adjusted to
large contributions for support of the governing structure. Other
iresults important for the Meiji followed the commercialization of
agriculture in the late Tokugawa period.
The pace of commercialization was accentuated by changing
farm technology. The variety of crops increased, and fertilizers
iI
began to be used,causing productivity to increase. When he pro-
j duced more than subsistence level the peasant could sell for money
i
to buy fertilizer and personal goods. This caused a change in the
i f ly d i
4 4
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!sive farming, and money profits weighed against cooperative groups.
1 The individual with a small holding had a decided advantage over
d the cooperative group (6). As productivity increased farmers were
able to market a good percentage of their crops. The table.shows
i the extent of commercialization at the start of the Meiji period.
The commercialization of agriculture did several things. It
H accustomed people to working for wages and profits, making them
i more responsive to profit incentives, This in turn allowed satisfac-
i (6) Allen, CC. - A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, p. 16
New York, Preager,1962
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i tory expansion of agriculture under the Meiji; until the successful
establishment of heavy industry agriculture was the main revenue
base of the Meiji government. Incentives which depend on market
forces work better when a large proportion of the crop is for
market.
Ii PROPORTION OF CROPS MARKETED IN EARLY 1870's
Rice 15-20
Coarse grains. beans. Dotatoes 5-10
Industrial crops 80-90
Vegetables 20-30
Fruit 20-30
Total (all crops) 25-31
Figures exclude tax payments in kind
Source: Lockwood, W.W. ed. -The State and
Economic Enterprises in Japan p. 39
Princeton Univ. Press, 1965
iii
Although the farmers acquired wealth in an economic sense,
Oriost of them did not acquire a substantially better standard of
living until the Meiji era. Under Tokugawa whatever money they
I eraned was rapidly drained off to increased feudal dues or inflation
I in the cost of farm supplies. Inflation was caused,among other
things, by debasing of the currency by the Tokugawa regime. Despairii
II
; ;
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iover the continually rising taxes led to increasingly frequent
jpeasant riots near the end of the Tokugawa period, so frequent they
H eroded the "mandate to rule" of the Tokugawa family. When 1967 came,
,fdissatisfaction with the status-quo was so widespread that the Meiji
j were able to effect a basically political revolution, with very
i little actual fighting. They were thus spared the necessity of
t
irebuilding a country ravaged by civil war.
In summary, the Meiji started their reforms with a number of
advantages that were already developed in the socio-economic system.
iA good portion of the population were literate and could be taught
western methods. The agricultural economy was already adjusted to
i heavy taxation, so the new government could support its programs
iI
I without drastic upheaval in the economy. The samurai were betterf l
i able to see, and communicate to others, the need for developing
II western institutions and industries than were the literati of China.
1iThe samurai had an ingrained aptitude for self-denialand corporate
effort. An extensive, influential class of experienced merchants
if
had developed, often fused with samurai energy and national pride.
The commercialization of ag
The commercialization of agriculture accustomed the peasants to
iworking for money and made them responsive to profit incentives.
And finally the new government did not have to rebuild the country
iafter a civil war.
This was the situation when the Meiji began their reforms.
I i
'--
I
li·
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Of course the big handicaps they had were lack of extensive natural
resources, lack of heavy industry, lack of knowledge of western tech-
niques, and lack of time: reform and industrialization had to be
carried out before western encroachments had grown to an irreversible
point. Suitable financial policy of the government helped overcome
these handicaps.
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MONETARY POLICY
The reformed agricultural tax became the basis
of Meiji finances. At the time of the restora-
tion the currency was debased. The Meiji
reformed it, but only slowly. Since agricultur-
al tax revenues were insufficient to meet their
needs the government resorted to printing in-
convertible notes, which had the effect of
delaying stabilization of the currency. Three
separate attempts were made to establish a cen4
tral bank and the instruments of monetary policy4
The first failed because of inadequate attention.
to the foreign Drice fluctuations or gold and
-silver. The second failed because its regulatioA
gave an incentive to continually increase the
supply of money; the government could not ade-
quately control the money supply. The third
attempt succeeded, and included with it
ancillary financial intermediaries which en-
couraged a high rate of saving among the lower
classes, which in turn contributed to the
capitalization of industry. During the Meiji
period Japan fought wars with China and Russia,
which were expensive. The disbursement of huge
sums in a short time produced a sharp rise in
national income. The indemnity payments from
the defeated opponents further increased the
capital supply for industrial expansion.
Under Tokugawa the land tax had been collected in kind, and
Iusually amognted to 40-50% of the crop. The Meiji adapted this
"feudal system to their own needs, substituting a percentage tax on
the assessed value of the land. A uniform rate was charged throughoutl
Ithe whole country. By this means the government income from the
tax rose from ¥20 million in 1972 to a level of *68 million in the
i ii
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i year 1875 (1). The tax was collected in money, and did not
i fluctuate with crop performance. This increased revenue was still
not enough to meet the government's needs in their plan for rapidi
i industrialization.
I At the beginning of the Meiji era the currency was in a state
i of confusion. The Tokugawa had minted debased coinage at different
times, and this was still in-circtlAtion. The Meiji determined to
reform the currency, but their revenues were insufficient for their
needs, so for a period they too issued debased coins and inconverti-
ble paper currency. There was substantial pressure from foreign
governments to reform; worthless paper was accumulating in the hands
i of their merchants. The Meiji finally agreed, and promised to
compensate the foreign merchants. But since (in 1870) the new mint
was not completed the government exchanged some coin for paper money
at a very unfair rate. It was not until the middle of the 1880's
that the Japanese currency was really stabilized, after the creation
of efficient central banking.
This constant resort to the printing press, while regarded as
backward by the west, really bought time for Japan. -'The people hurt
most by it were foreign merchants because, as pointed out in the
!! last chapter, a money economy was just beginning to reach the rural
I(1) Tobata Seiichi - The Modernization of Japan, v.1 p. 94
Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, Tokyo, 1966
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Sareas. But this kind of expedient got out of hand when the first
I National Bank was allowed to issue inconvertible paper.
In 1872 the National Banks were set up, modelled on the
"United States' system at the time (which also later proved inadequate)
The banks were required to maintain a 100% reserve, and to keep 60%
i fIof their capital in inconvertible government notes and 40% in specie.
It was thought that this would give credibility to the government
notes and allow the Meiji to keep issuing them to meet their needs.
H I
as currency. The conversion price to gold and silver coin was
fixed. (2)
S The table of Currency in Circulation shows that the National
liBank notes did not fulfill their expected function during the period
1 1870-1976. They rapidly ceased to be issued. This first attempt at
Iinational banking failed because no consideration was given to price
shows the price of gold in silver declined over these years, but the
,Meiji silver-gold conversion was fixed. This allowed a great deal of
.arbitrage and a drain of gold from Japan.
S A trader could buy a National Bank note with silver yen. Be-
cause the silver-gold conversion rate was fixed he could then
ii 1iexchange the note for gold, export the gold, and sell it for more(2) Stillson, R. -"The Effect of Western-type Financial Institutions
l on Meiji Financial Devel.", in Journal of Oriental Studies v.8i
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CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION, 1.869-1898
-~------,----,
iYear
1ýj869Iii;
19870
1871
1872
S1873
1.874
1875
1876
1877
-1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885ii
i 1886
S19q87
11888
12.4
30.8
48,i
42.7
42.7
46.5
45.4
40.7
42.5
39.8
36.8
35.7
34.0
31.6
28.4
27.8
17.9
33.6
(year
Bank of
end, million
National
J. notes Bk. nts. notes coin
50.1
55.5
60.3
68,4
88.3
101.8
100.6
105.1
105.8
139.4
130.3
124.9
118.9
o109.4
98.0
93.4
88.3
67.8
55.8
46.7
8.6
8.6
4.3
1.4
2.0
1.4
1.7
13.4
26.3
34.0
34.4
34.4
34.4
34.3
31.0
30.2
29.5
28.6
27.7
______________________________________________
yen)
Tokugawa
24.6
31.6
38.6
24.9
19.2
4.7
1.1
0.7
0.1
0.1
Government
paper coin
146.3
134.4
109.9
70.6
37.5
28.7
27.1
23.3
19.4
16.2
14.3
8.9
5.0
Total
221.0
230.1
229.8
199.0
194.5
184.9
172.9
177.3
184.1
222.7
221.1
208.0
195.1
179.5
166.3
156.0
150.9
165.1
155.8
173.8
I-------
-I---
4.0
53.5
65.8
Bank of National Tokugawa
J. notes Bk. nts. notes coin
Year
II
1889
1890
,1891
1892
1893
18949
, 1895
1896
1897
i11898
SSource:
ii
I'
ii
26.7
25.8
24.9
23.9
22.8
21.8
20.8
16.5
5.0
1.9
Total
138.9
205.4
210.9
216.7
238.6
247.7
281.9
300.4
330.4
285.7
Patrick, Hugh T. "External Equilibrium and Internal Converti-
bility: Financial Policy in Japan", in Journal
of Economic History, v. 25 , 1965
Government
paper coin
41.2 41.9
33.3 43.4
27.9 42.4
20.8 46.2
16.4 50.7
13.4 62.7
11.1 69.7
9.4 76.2
7.5 91.7
5.4 81.0
~ir~l
~ __ __ ~I~--------
79.1
102.9
115.7
125.8
149. 7
149.8
180.3
198.3
226.2
197.4
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RELATIVE PRICES OF INCONVERTIBLE PAPER,
SILVER AND GOLD, 1868-1897
Paper Money Price
of Silver
Year
1868
1869
1Q70
1871
1872
1873
1874
1975
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
Silver Price
of Gold
(world price)
15.59
15.60
15.57
15,57
15.63
15.92
16.17
16.59
17.88
17.22
17.94
19.40
18.05
18.16
18.19
18.64
18.57
19.41
20.78
21.13
21.99
22.10
19.76
20.92
23.72
26.47
32.56
31.61
30.65
34.34
Source: Patrick, op cit
0.748
0.962
1.033
0.978
1.018
1.036
1.038
1.029
0.989
1.033
1.099
1.212
1.477
1.696
1.571
1.264
1,.089
1.0551.000
1,.000
1.0001,000
1. 000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1995
1896
1.97
_I _ __ _· · &__ 1·
_·__ _ __
18982 146 115 124 575
21883 114102 104 553iI
i 100i1+ :95 95 518
11885 100 100 100 621
1886 02 94 93 733
188il87 94 94 94 703
188, 95 93 94 718
l1889  103 199 10too 691
111890 135 109 117 801
i1891 111 106 107 783
1.902 114 108 110 818
H1893 106 116 109 858
i1894 112 114 113 1029
1895 120 124 123 997!i "
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PRICES AND REAL NATIONAL INCOME
iYear Ohkawa Yamada National Real Nat.
Wholesale Cost of Income Income
Price Living Deflator
Index Index
'1879 105 90 446
q179 121 97 104 587
1•90 145 112 122 655
1981 160 122- 131 AliV11
ii tii
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1896
1897
1898
1q99
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
19083
1909
1910
1911
Ohkawa
Wholesale
Price
Index
130
144
145
152
163
155
157
167
176
138
194
209
202
192
195
202
Source: Patrick, op cit
Yamada
Cost of
Living
Index
National
Income
Deflator
133
152
160
155
172
167
173
183
189
196
203
219
212
206.
208
221
134
156
167
156
176
172
180
190
195
200
208
224
216
212
214
229
Real Nat.
Income
937
980
1298
1133
1177
1264
1107
1236
1242
1123
1326
1418
1477
1472
1413
1621
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silver than he had started with. The value of the National Bank
'icapital would thus decline in world prices. The result was that the
1Ibank ceased to issue notes. Since the banks were required to maintain
Ha 100% reserve this meant they could make no loans at all, and they
1 ceased to have a function. In 1876 there were only 4 National Banks
To consolidate their position the Meiji had promised annual
!stipends to a number of daimyo and samurai who had supported tham,
iin compensation for the loss of their feudal dues under the
i '
inational land-tax system. In 1876 the government tried to eliminate
ithe burden of this stipend. It was able to limit it to a fixed
flamount as opposed to a perpetuity. Of this amount half was paid in
1cash and half in 9% bonds.(4) As usual these government bonds were
inconvertible, and their market value quickly declined.
In 1R76 the National Banks were allowed to issue notes on
Hthe collateral of these bonds. This was done both to revitalize
,ithe banks and to placate the samurai, who were understandably
ijupset at the declining value of the bonds they had been forced to
iaccept. The bonds were inconvertible, so National Bank notes would
1Ino longer be convertible to specie at fixed rates, which eliminated
!the possibility of arbitrage. The table of Currency in Circulation
(3) Stillson, op. cit.
(4) Tobata, op. cit.
i t
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1ishows a large increase in National Bank notes following 1876. Also
I by this time nearly all the debased Tokugawa money had been called in.1i iI
IThe number of National Banks grew rapidly.
Eventually the National Banks declined. This was not an
i nternal failing of the banks, which were quite solvent, but the resul
tof realization by the Meiji regime that the National Banks were not
lfulfilling the desired function of controlling the money supply.
In 1877 the last serious internal challenge to the Meiji - the
ISatsuma rebellion - took place. As usual the large government
-expenditures in prosecuting the war were covered by an issue of.
inconvertible notes. They were sold to the National Banks, who
1icould they issue loans against them. Profits from these loans served
Has the backing for more loans, there being no limit on the banks'
Illending ability. So there was an incentive to keep expanding the
imoney supply, which obviously produced inflation. As the Prices and
ilIncome table shows, the price index rose rapidly in the years follow-
ing the Satsuma rebellion. Inflation produced a foreign trade
ildeficit. The government could not float substantial bond issues
.]without losing control of the money supply. In 1879 controls wereiI
iimposed on the National Banks' ability to make loans, and no new
!iNational Banks were allowed.
In 1892-94 the government ran a budget surplus, or which
2 more will be said in the next chapter. The excess money was used to
if
i
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,buy back V14 million of the outstanding inconvertibly paper, and to
i1create a Reserve Fund of Y26 million (5). Loans were made from this
f fund to Japanese exporters with the stipulation that they repay with
!foreign currency they received for their goods. In this way the
Ivolume of government paper currency was reduced and the reserve of
J specie increased. As the Relative Prices table shows the paperi i
,j price of silver declined. The Bank of Japan, which had been created
in 1882, began to replace government paper currency with its own
notes, which could be issued on the security of nonconvertible
paper (including corporate stock) as well as government notes. In
1886 the government stopped issuing paper currency and the Bank
SRelative Prices table shows, the paper-silver exchange rate at last
IIostabilized.
At the same time ancillary financial institutions were created:
ii
Sthe Hypothec Bank (agricultural mortgages) and Agricultural and Indus-
itrial Banks. The post office saving banks were expanded. A great
many commercial banks followed these. These banks allowed a large
I contribution to the capital stock through many small rural deposits,
i and taught the common people very early the practice of saving. The
Growth table shows that the period 1890-1911 was one of sustained
Sprogress, attributable in large measure to the stabilization of the
(5) Tobata, op cit.
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GROWTH RATES OF INCOME
(in annual rate, %)
-3
1903-12
1908-17
1908-17
1913-22
1913-22
1918-27
I
1983-92
1893-92
1888-97
19q8-97
1893-19
I
1898-19
1998-1907
1 in 1 1189-!9
i! ia9••o
4 • "_1"
Primary Secondary
Industry Industry
2.4
4.3
4.3
1.9
1.6
1.2
1.8
2.3
Total
4.3
4.9
5.5
3.0
2.9
3.6
4.0
5.2
UVu1: ;r; AGUri U. LIj nda.Wd - I \1i I t: 1IAN n( A R
Since 1878; Kinokini:ya
Tokyo, 1957
of the Japanese Economy
Bookstore Co.
Tertiary
Industry
5.6
4.7
5.9
4.1
4.6
4.6
5.2
7.9
!i-
--
7.4
8.4
3.9
2.9
6.5
5.6
4.3
--
I ý
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!
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monetary sector.
In the summer of 1894 Japan became involved in a war with
China in Korea. The causes were complex politically, but the result
twas a clear victory for the modernized Japanese forces. The Chinese
,were compelled to pay a huge indemnity, in silver. This money was
Hused to convert Japan to the gold standard, on which most of the
rest of the world functioned at the time.
What long-term results did this monetary policy have on the
ijindustrialization of Japan? One obvious conclusion is that the
i;stable monetary system,achieved as described, fostered growth of the
jindustrial enterprise. Much literature is available to demonstrate
Ilthis. But there were other, less obvious results as well. It will
be argued here that (a) the monetary policy caused a predominance
Iof bank capital, helping to keep control of expansion in the hands
H!of the government, and (b) the ancillary institutions made the
itransfer of capital from savers to industry more efficient by
linarrowing the gap between interest charged and interest paid.
The predominance of bank capital (loans) over private capital
i(sale of stock) is a characteristic of the Japanese economy even
1today. At the beginning of the Meiji period there was generally a
ilow level of accumulated capital, it being mostly the personal
__· ~____· __
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1ýholdings of the chonin. At the same time, the businesses that were
most needed to compete with the westerners (armaments and heavy
H industry) required capital on a large scale. When the government
i poured large amounts of notes into the National Banks and later the
iBank of Japan, the principal customers -for the subsequent loans were
lithe large industries, there being insufficient private capital to
!1sell stock; besides, most of these firms were closely-held, and in thel
pearly Meiji period wereseldom joint-stock ventures. Certain banks P
,thus developed close relations with certain large businesses, there
!being no great diversity of small firms. When large business next
,needed capital, it was easy to get it from their "friendly" banker,
fespecially since the government, as shown above, continued to push
large note issues on the banks since the revenues from the land
,tax were inadequate. The result over time was a preponderance of
ibank-debt in the capital structure of Japanese industry, which
'meant the government could control the rate of expansion by controllin
bthe amount of notes it sold.
This can be demonstrated by examining the following tables.
The Growth of Banking table shows that Agricultural and Industrial
,Banks did not exist until 1898. The Post Office Savings Bank-
j@a the only other institutions:: handling the savings of the mass
of the rural population. The savings of the rural mass (the
majority at the time) give a rough idea of the ca ital that mi t
1!
_______ -J
.1j
i
I
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____ _ __ _ ~ "i
$ Iii
GROWTH OF BANKING IN JAPAN
(number of banks)
National Ordinary
Banks Banks
Year
1 R73
1,74
1I75
1876
1977
1878
1979
1880
1881
1882
1383
1885
18861987
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1995
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
Quasi-
Banks
120
369
438
573
741
744
748
741
711
695
702
678
680
Source: Stillson, op. cit.
Savings
Banks
Agric. &
Indust.
Banks
8
26
95
151
151
148
143
141
140
139
136
136
135
134
134
134
133
133
133
133
121
584
1
1
1
10
39
90
176
207
214
218
220
221
211
218
217
252
270
545
700
792
1005
1223
1444
1561
1802
1R67
1841
1754
1708
1697
1670
1658
1635
1617
23
30
86
149
221
260
338
419
441
431
469
467
481
483
48 9
483
/j
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have been available for stock purchase had a developed stock market
existed, But as the table of Post Office Deposits shows, the
i amount of money in the Post Office Savings Bank was very small in
Ithe beginning, and had only reached Y28 million in 1996. Yet in
i that same year the paid-up capital of all types of business firms
! was f398 million, as shown in the Number and Capital table. So
1 even if an organized stock market had existed, it is doubtful
'whether the largely agricultural population could have adequately
.funded industry. So a predominance of bank capital developed, Had
: the government taken steps to foster a private capital market first,
and constructed industry from there, industrial expansion would
have been slower, and would not have been concentrated in essential
industries as it was,
After 1096 the Agricultural and Industrial Banks were
!established to serve the rural areas. There followed immediately
i a large increase in the number of Ordinary (commercial) banks,
many in the rural areas. Likewise the number of savings banks
increased greatly after this time, In a situation where there are
many banks, each must compete for deposits, and for loan business
with which to make profits on those deposits. The expected result
1 is that interest rates paid on deposits go up, while interest rates
charged on loans go down. In other words, the process of trans-
I j 1
~
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POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS
DEPOSITS IN i
End of Year Deposits
1875 15224
1976 41445
1377 100138
1378 296290
1879 494115
1880 662691
1?81 821938
188? 1058224
i1883 2298502
1884 5260484
1 85 9050254
19 86 15462053
1 87 18213282
1288 19758482
1289 20441354*
1890 19514844
1q91 20149848
1.92 21836663
1993 24815986
1994 24962459
1995 27748216
1996 28678291
1i97 26335629
1898 22492262
1•999 23335242
1900 24015138
Source: Financial and Economical Annual of Japan, #11, 1902
Government Printing Office, Tokyo
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RATES OF INTEREST7in 7o)
Year
1902
1903
1905
o1906
1907
Average
12.1
10.7
10.7
11.0
10.3
9.9
10.8
10.0
8.4
High
6.6
6.1
5.8
5.8
5.8
5.6
5.7
5.7
5.3
4.6
Savings Deposits
Low
6.0
5.5
5.4
5.5
5.4
5.3
5.4
5.3
4.5
4.4
Average
6.3
5.8
5.6
5.7
5.6
5.4
5.6
5.5
4.8
4.5
Source: Financial and Economical Annual of Japan, y4ad 1912
Government Printing Office, Tokyo
Loans
Low
10.0
9,0
9.0
9.3
8.4
8.3
9.2
8.2
7.1
7.0
High
13.9
12.6
12.3
12.6
12.4
11,5
12.2
11.9
10.7
10.3
1908
1909
1910
1911
'-I
---- -
-
,·
NUMBER AND CAPITAL OF COMPANIES
Joint stock companies
Limited partnerships
Ordinary partnerships
Total
Joint stock companies
Limited partnerships
Ordinary partnershins
Total
Joint stock companies
Limited partnerships
Ordinary partnerships
Total
Number Authorized
Capital
2,585 573,285,241
1,667 32,?257,928
344 13,680,790
4,596 619,223,949
3,475
3,029
540
7044
4,254
3,560
7894
8,598:
L57,107,294
50,073,229
23,655,120
930,835,t643
1,0333,435,090
54,361,699
40,025,582
1,127,822,371
Paid-up
Capital
357,524,152
27,572,436
12,467,944
397,564,53211
560,035,782i
39,413,244i
22,227,4321
621,676,458
695,903,017i
196:i'i
I98
1900i
iSource: FinaLncia! and Economical Annual of Japan, .year !9-12
// Government Printing Office, Tokyo
i
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38,151,611
779,251,3061
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i i
iferring investment funds from suppliers to users is done more
11 efficiently; less is consumed by the middleman. Upon examining the
Rate of Interest table for the late Meiji period, it can be seen
i that loan interest did move steadily downward, despite the fact that
I 1396-1911 embraced both inflation and recession periods. Interest
i paid on deposits also moved down, but not as fast. The spread
' between the two did decline, suggesting the more efficient trans-
Ii
II
1: fer of investment capital.
ii "
In summary, Meiji policy in the beginning was to issue large
i amounts of inconvertible currency to meet their huge financial needs.
i While perhaps necessary, this was at best a temporary expedient.
: Coupled with two inadequate structures for the National Banks it
i !
produced monetary instability, which brought pressure from the
!foreigners. The Bank of Japan was successful in stabilizing the
Imonetary system. Meiji monetary policy produced two other results:
a predominance of bank capital over private capital, and a reduction
dlin the spread between interest paid and interest charged.
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large expenditures were made in the military !
sector. While this was not the most productiveiI
area from an economic point of view, it hastene•
the decline of foreign control in Japan, and
enabled the nation to win two wars and the
associated large indemnities. It also accelera
ted the growth of other heavy industries, sinceil
the gun factories and shipyards also turned out !
mining equipment, boilers, and so forth in their
"spare" time. The government was thus able to I
directly control the direction and scale of
heavy-industry growth. Fourthly, significant
sums were spent to hire western technicians and l
to send Japanese abroad to study.
One of the first steps of the new Meiji government was to end
old feudal dues and replace them with a land tax payable in money, !i
I i
__
c p e 
y o g 
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CAL POLICYI
II
The fiscal policy of the Meiji government may
be divided into four broad areas. First, the
land tax was reformed as a revenue base for theI'
government. In the early years this tax was no,
adequate to meet all government expenses, and
large amounts of paper money were issued to maki
up the difference. While this disturbed the
stabilization of the monetary system, it did
provide needed growth. Later on it caused in-
flation. Periods of deliberate deflation (e.g.
under Matsukata) had the result of forcing a
shift in the distribution of the labor force,
away from agriculture into industry. while I
newer methods allowed total farm production to 1!
keep growing. A second aspect of fiscal policy'
was the establishment of large, government-run i
industries, and their subsequent sale to private
owners. This resulted in the growth of the
zaibatsu so characteristic of the Japanese
industry. These industries were usually monop.-
olistic, but as a result they faced a suffi- I
ciently large domestic market to enable them
U. XjIo 'j om etI.. efe tiJ,.ve'.lJ with ~ f. 'Jei' ner Tird1J
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,not in kind, directly to the central government. The tax was based
Von the assessed value of land, not the crop yield in any particular
Vyear. It was thus both predictable (for the farmer) and reliable (forj
ithe government). It usually ran about 3% and was lighter than the
farmer's feudal dues had been. Later in the Meiji period other taxes
1were added. An income tax was created in 1887, with rates ranging
!-from 1 to 3%, The various indirect taxes and their dates of introduc-
1!tion are: taxes on the brewing and selling of sake (1i71), a sugar
!!excise (1901), a soy tax (18.5), bourse tax (1885), mining tax (1q75,
1890), fishery taxes (1987), tobacco tax (various, from 1976), tax on
ithe manufacture and sale of confectionary products (1985). Some
,dimport duties were collected, but Japan did not regain full control
Sof her tariffs until 1911. (1) i
As the table'of Sources of State -Revenue shows, tax receipts I
iconstitute a small part of total government expenditure in the early .
,!years, and. reach 90% only about 1776. Loans are also not a significan;f
ifactor in these years, which is not surprising given the situation
Iof the government. Most of the deficit was made up by resorting to the
printing press, in the form of inconvertible paper.
It is very important to recall from chapter two that a real .
Jmoney economy was only just coming into existence at this time in
Jaoan. Also much of the money printed went directly into the hands of !
i(l1) Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, #11 (1902)
Government Printing Office, Tokyoif
_ 1_·------~-·----____II_--·-- 1~1~ --- ·- ·
capital-accumulators (rather than immediate spenders) in the form of
Istipends to former nobles who had lost their feudal dues in the land-
tax reform. Thus, although this kind of printing-press financing
wrought havoc with efforts to stabilize the currency and create nation"j
Hal banking, the agricultural sector (which at the time contaihed the V
igreat buki'of the capital and labor of the nation) was able to absorb
,,the large parer issues without adverse strain.
The normal result when a government prints large amounts of
ipaner money is inflation, since the supply of currency in circulation
increases much faster than the supoly of goods and services available
for purchase. But in Japan this did not happen. The creation of the
iland tax, the abolition of the feudal dues, the printing of large i
i
.,amounts of paper money, and the introduction of a money economy to the,
flrural areas all coincided. The tax, which was due in the harvest
Hmonths, had to be paid in cash, so poor farmers flooded the market with
rice at that time, driving prices down (2). Meanwhile wealthy farmers,
'and former daimyo were typically receiving stipends from the governmeni
1 .1
'in place of their lost feudal dues, so these men could withold their
crops until prices improved, paying taxes with accumulated savings.
hSo some poor farmers were gradually made unemployed (unemployment
Cusually counteracts inflation) and were then available to shift to
ithe growing industrial market as laborers. And former daimyo (who had !
2) Oshima, Harry T. "Meij~i Fiscal Policy", in Lockwood, William J.
The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, Princetin, 1965 H
i _ · rii
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been conspicuous consumers, as mentioned in chapter two) were en-
Icouraged to save their money for periods of time, thus fostering
capital accumulation and making loans available for industry. Recall
that at this time banking was not extensive in the rural areas, so
i former daimyo, who could travel and had widespread connections, were
Hlikely to save at city banks, who naturally made loans to industries
in their city. Had rural banking been extensive, loans could have
,been made in large nvmbers to poor farmers, with a wholly different
effect.
As seen previously, the primary pressure for ending the issue
'of large amounts of Daper money and recalling bonds came from the
,foreign governments, whose merchants in Japan were being hurt, and
Ifrom bankers, who suffered from arbitrage. The agricultural sector
p!robably could have withstood this practice for longer than it had to,V
-!Recall that the onset of drastic inflation was associated with the
,elimination in 1976 of payments to former daimyo, and the substitution
!of a fixed amount of inconvertible government bonds. Widespread
jidissatisfaction with the declining value of these bonds led the
L! aovernment to the expedient of allowing the National Banks to issue
inotes against these bonds, in unrestricted quantity. Inflation
1ibegan, and was really accentuated the next year with the floating of
the Satsuma Rebellion bonds through the National Banks, if
Runaway growth of the money supply thus resulted, instead of the !
controlled growth arising from limited paper money issues and a
'--I--------
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SOURCES OF ANNUAL STATE REVENUE( million)
Taxes Loans- Govwt.
Enterprise
3.3
1
1q70
1Yea71
I17 I3
1874
14.3
22.6
64.5
64.
75.8
57.8
50.3
46.2
49.7
53.5
52.7
58.8
64.9
64.2
1R!5 63.,
4.7
.9
4.8
10.5
.1
.1
.2
.3
.2
2.4
2.6
3.6
7.6
3.6
3.8
3.9
5.4
5.0
2.0
5.6
5.6
Misc. Paper Y
Issued
1.0
5.0
1.0
5.3
9.8
7.8
6.0
6.9
4.1
3.7
2.5
8.9
4.8
5.3
7.6
4.3
13.3
5.3
24.0
24.0
5.4
2.1
17.8
Total
33.1
34,4
21.0
22.0
50.4
,5.5
73.4
96.3
69.5
59.4
52.3
62.4
62.2
63.4
73.5
85.1
76.7
Source: Financial and Economic Annualof Japan, #11 (1902)
Government Printing Office, Tokyo
9.6
1975
1876
1877
1878
1879
1980
1881
1882
19 3
....
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ijmoney market dominated by the savings of rural daimyo. This inflation i
ilwould have happened sooner or later anyway as industrial capital came
to supercede rural daimyo capital in the money market, but the point
+ + 1%1% 1-0 1 -1 rl + 'kin IV% ek, .. ,.....
controllable expedient of printing money for a while longer than it
i did.
Prince Matsukata was minister of finance when the Satsuma
inflation occurred. His solution was to run a current surplus in the U
,,following years and use the surplus to buy back much of the outstanding
Ipaper. His chief goal, as seen, was to permit consolidation of the
Bank of Japan. But the "Matsukata deflation" also had a useful effect!
iin the agricultural sector. As prices fell rapidly, many small
I (i.e. less efficient) farms went bankrupt, and the farmers were
1forced to enter the industrial labor market and move to the cities.
As the table of Labor Force Distribution shows, the farm labor force 4
actually grew at a rate slower than the population as a whole (i.e.
I declined) while the manufacturing labor force grew rapidly. Other
sectors, such as building construction, mining, etc. are not shown butlI
ijthey also increased. At the same time agricultural production did
'not suffer,d.ue to use of fertilizers and modern methods. As the
!!table of Agricultural Production shows, yield per tan increased
during this time, as did fertilizer consumption. So by deliberate 11
!deflation the Meiji government was able to force a more rapid shift !I
of the labor force than might otherwise have occurred.
--T1I
: : i ii ii i
--
1R80
1881
1R82
1988
1W884
Manufacturing
1.091
1.172
1.264
1.347
1.438
1.525
.434
39.6
Source: Ohkawa, Kazushi - The Growth Rate of the Japanese Economy
Since 1878 ; Tokyo, Kinokuniya Bookstore Co., Ltd., 1957
various pages
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LABOR FORCE DISTRIBUTION
(milions)
1985
numerical
change
1880-1385
% change
1980-1~85
Total
36.9
37.2
37.5
37.9
38.2
38.5
1.6
4.3
Farming
15.7
15.8
16.0
16.1
16.2
16.3
.6
3.8
~I-----
------C~~~-'-
-
r ------ --- --- ·-·· ··
--- ----------
lq85
i I
i i
1 iI 1
1898-1902 1.516 10.6
1903-07 1.626 7.2
1908-12 1.734 6.6
1913-17 1.843 6.31918-22 1.927 4.6
Period Fertilizer Consumed Index -  % Change from
(*million, 1934 prices) Previous Period
1883-87 212.0 100.0 -
1888-92 218.8 103.2 3.2
1893-97 231.9 109.4 6.0
1898-1902 248.2 117.1 7.0
1903-1907 270.5 127.6 9,0
1908-1912 322.6 152.2 19.3
Source: Nakamura, James I. - "Growth of Japanese Agriculture, 1R75-192C
in Lockwood, William W. - The State and Economic Enterprise
in Japan, Princeton, 1965
I',
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
(in koku)
Period Rice Yield per Tan % Change from
Previous Period
1878-82 1.166 -
1883-87 1.297 11.2
1888-92 1.428 10,1
1893-97 1.371 -4.0
i
i
i
J
i i
i
i t
i i
i
k
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Industry required plants and materials as well as labor. In the,'
,, early years no private group had sufficient capital to construct
. western-style industry. The Meiji government undertook the construc-
Stion of state enterprises in various areas, especially heavy industry.
:This was a crucial decision, though it has not been without side-
!effects. If the government had allowed the price system and free
markets to create many small, duplicative, inefficient firms they
i would have quickly been defeated by western imports; the westerners i
Sflirm.ly controlled Japan's tariff laws. By building,and subsequently
selling to orivate owners, state. enterprises in certain key industries:
ý the government produced large, modern firms able to compete with the
outside world rather than with each other.
The development of state enterprises was intimately connected
!with the military needs of the nation; some of the earliest and largest
state factories were munitions plants. As pointed out in chapter two,i
'a great many former samurai were available for Dositions in the new
administration. The whole country had. a strongly military outlook.
;'The ex-Samurai correctly saw the foreign challenge as one to be met
'first and foremost on a military basis. Without recovery of tariff
autonomy it did little good to improve domestic industry.
Various small-arms factories had been established under the
Shogunate. The Meiji gove-rnment took these over and consolidated
them into two large arsenals at Tokyo and Osaka in 1877. A most
_i.important acquisition was the shipyard at Yokosuka, begun by the,-.. ...... ... P o t n --- u... . .. .... . . . .. ... . . ... . .s ; ,4, "t- F .... . . .....
Shugunate in 1864. By October 1871 the Meiji government had installed
160 machines and 50 iron-working furnaces, and turned out 10 vessels
of 740 tons Since ships could not be assembled as fast as the shops
Icould turn out parts, Yokosuka was also directed to build mining
Happaratus for the Ikuno mine, as well as steam machines and boilers
for other industries. Part of this rapid expansion was supervised by
i imported foreign technicians. (3)
This pattern is typical of other yards and plants either
l1expanded or built from scratch by the government prior to about 1880:
Nagas.ki shipnvyard Tsukij i Naval Arsenl Twwahna nuerr H lant + c
In addition the government constructed mines and steel-making plants
'to supply these armament factories. The list is quite long, and its
recitation would serve no purpose here. The important points are
Jthat (a) all the plants were made large and efficient on the western i
imodel (usually by employing foreign experts), with as little duplica- U
jtion as possible; internal competition was deliberately avoided; (b)
Imost plants could produce faster than complex machines could be
Sassembled and put to use by the military, so instead of building a
ismaller plant or running at less-than-full output the excess capacity
was directed at building new mines, etc.; (c) heavy industry came to
Idepend on armament orders, with the obvious and ominous result once
'the needs of mere defense had been satisfied.
(3) Shibusawa Keizo - Japanese Society in the Meiji Era, I
Tokyo, Obunsha, 1958
( .
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Thus the government gradually acquired non-military industries
in addition to the original armament factories. These included mines
iat Aburato, Nakosaka, Ani, Takashima, and Kosaka, several brick and
cement factories, and silk and cotton mills. These last were started
Ito provide blankets for the military and to produce products salable
.abroad, bringing in needed foreign exchange,
On November 5, 1880 an important change in government policy too
jplace. The decision was made to sell off the government enterprises.
HOver the next few years most of them were sold, with the exception of
tthe armament plants, shipyards, railways, and the telegraph system.
IThe table of Purchasers and Prices gives information on the sale of
Ii 1
some of the major industries; there were numerous smaller businesses.
A striking feature of this table is the advantageous nature of the
sale to each of the buyers. The government appears to have taken a
substantial loss in each case, while the buyers obtained very generousii ii
land lengthy payment terms. Most of the buyers were also very promi- ii
1nent socially and politically.
The questions thus arise why did the government sell their
'businesses in this way? What did they expect the results to be, and
what were the actual results? Several arguments can be advanced.
ISome, especially those of Marxist leanings, like to believe that the
rgovernment sought to solidify its position by an alliance with the
Imost wealthy and prominent factions outside office. Key industries
'could in this way be kept under direct control of individuals
PURCHASERS AND PRICES OF GOVERNMENT
ENTERPRISES
Enterprise
!Fukugawa
Icement fact.
Kosaka mine
in n w
i
i •~nrrr~
Date of Gov't Purchase
Sale Invest. Price
1884 V 169,631 * 61,700
Terms
25 years
1884 547,476 273,000 *200,000 over
25 years, bal.
in 16 more yrs.
Purchaser
i
Asano'ire :
Soichiro
Kuhara
Shozaburo
U
Hglass fact.
iArni mine
Sakai cotto
mill
n
Ozuku mine
Tomioka silk
mill
Fukugawa
brick fact..
Takashima
coal mine
Annai mine
,Nakaosaka
imine
INagasaki
1885 189,631 80,000 55 annual pay-
ments, start
in 1890
1885 1,606,271
1878
1979
1884
1874
1884
1884
1884
337,000 *10,000 down
Y87,000 in 10
years, bal. in
25,000 15 years
149,546 27,131 *12,784 in 15
years, bal. in
93,276 83,862
550,000 *200,000 down
bal. in 7 yrs
675,093 75,000 *2500 down,
bal. in 29 yrs
Nishimura
Katsuzo
Ichibe
24
Hamazaki
Okuda Hamba
3
Asano
Soichiro
Goto Shojiro
Furukawa
Ichibe
73,803 25,000 Y250 down, bal Sakamoto
in 20 years Yahachi
628,767 459,000 25 years
shipyard
Iwasaki
Yataro
_1______3_1··
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i
i
i
Aburato 1884.
mine
48,608 27,943 *3c
b65
bal
Source: Smith, Thomas C. - Political Char
ment in Japan: Government
Stanford University Press,
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'friendv +o +..the government. Another school of thought sees the bar-
jI[ain sales as a response to social and political pressure against the
HiMeiji regime. It is well known that around 1880 popular dissatisfac-
fltion with the government was pronounced. Many ex-samurai and daimyo
'1were resentful of their reduced position in society, and became even
'more resentful after the elimination of their government stipends.
The abortive Satsuma rebellion discouraged military resistance, but
"the resentment was chanelled into political partisan activity; the
'1development of political parties dates from this period. In 1881 the
"government was forced to promise a democratic constitution. The
.isale of state enterprise might be interpreted as another action of
1Ithis sort. Finally the sales might have been made for financial
reasons, to generate revenue.
Smith (ibid) makes an argument for the financial reason, based
ion the government's need for specie to stabilize the currency. But
1compare the money to be actually collected in the period 1880-1890
(from pp. 56-7) with the total state revenue (= total expenditure)
I..
from p, 49. The extremely generous sale terms provided for very littld
lincome to the government at this time relative to total expenditure.
1 t
Furthermore, as shown in chapter three, the need for specie was
Irapidly met by the Reserve Fund created during the Matsukata
1 1.2 - X- -4. 1 -- T ---- P- - 4.1- V -A -ý-- -- A - I-- T----
deflation, Loans from the Fund were made to Japanese exporters (p. 35
with the stipulation that they repay directly in the foreign currency
earned by their sales abroad.
- - ·---- LI--·-CI
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Some other information is relevant here. Although it was never
11recorded in the official government publications, the state enter-
I1prises were not earning profits at the time of their sale. Most of.
the profits shown on p. 49 came from the unsold businesses. The
iunprofitability of these businesses is referred to so frequently in
H Ji
.contemporary documents that their can be little doubt of it. -Matsu-
ikata himself even makes such reference in a financial report to
I the Prime Minister in 1990 (4) So the "bargains" were not all that
i good. Whether the sales were a response to political pressure, or i
iwere the result of growing philosophies of economic liber-.lism, are f
Ijboth moot arguments. Unquestionably the primary focus of political
lactivity was a more representative process, to get greater voice for U
i former samurai and daimyo.
A more plausible explanation might be the desire to foster
ithe growth of western-style joint-stock business (i.e. the corporate
f organization) after the government had done the part too difficult
for the private sector. The government plants were originally
built because the private sector lacked the capital to build on•
I
1a sufficiently large and efficient scale. Around 1880 these business-n
les were still not large by western standards, but they had been
equipped with the latest machinery, and a labor force trined In
western methods. The government had absorbed all the initial
-(4) T'suchiy•Pa•aca a.nd :Ouchi ;Hyoei -- "bllecltion.:6f"' Histbi caL
Materials on Finance and Economy of t he Ea~ly Meiji Period
.i,. v- -•o•1' • I., . ' 215 4 . 1okyi i ,.: • . 931;.." '.
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istart-up losses, and had prevented duplication of effort, thusf i
guaranteeing no domestic competition and at least a good chance to
I-compete with the west. By giving a head-start to selected industries i
Ii
Ha pattern for expansion was already set, and the industries were readyi
for private take-over. To continue support would serve no real pur-
i pose, and would be a financial drain,
Reviewing the development of joint-stock companies in 1899, the
!great industrialist Shibusawa Eiichi concluded that this form of
'enterprise was the source of the astonishing progress of Japanese
Sindustry. (5) He had been deeply impressed with the company system
during travels in Europe, where he had seen great industril pro-
jects impossible to construct without the united capital of many
individuals. He passed along many of these attitudes during a period 1
of office with the Ministry of Finance. When the government undertooki
iloans to ex-samurai to start new ventures in the 1880's, a condition
was that such enterprise be of the joint-stock form. It is possible I
that the government realized that it had done all the ground-breaking
oiietld•,in heavy industry, and tht a real boom in growth could now
only be made by a larger infusion of capital that it could reasonably i
!afford.
However, the government was much more successful in developing
1private ownership and financing for industry than in stimulating
(5) Hirschmeier, Johannes - "Shibusawa Eiichi", in Lockwood, W.K.
The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, Princeton, 1965
....
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ý joint-stock private enterprise. Former samurai, who had no ingrained
Hbusiness tradition and little capital, had little choice but to adopt
! the company form of organization if they wanted to go into industry. i
'They were largely the pioneers of company enterprise. But the
Ilgreat merchant houses, which had grown up in han trading monopolies, 1
were reluctant to relinquish their authoritarian character. Where
i useful for dealing with the government they instituted a company
I facade, but in reality the senior members of the family ruled with
tiron hands. This was made possible by control of their "own" banks,
ias mentioned in chapter three. They could get expansion capital
1 without resorting to stock issue; this has remained a characteristic
I of many large Japanese firms, where debt typically forms a much
larger proportion of total capitalization than for firms in the
,United States. An outstanding example is Mitsubishi, founded by
Ilwasaki Yataro. The company began as a continuation of a shipping
Iland trading establishment which had enjoyed the monopoly of the
ITosa han under the Shogunate. It had a company structure, but the
i( family owned all the stock.li
Notable clashes of the two forms of enterprise occurred.
i Shibusawa could not stand the monopoly practices of Mitsubishi, and
Sjoined with the Mitsui zaibatsu to establish a rival shipping
1company. Mitsui had suffered the most under Mitsubishi's monopoly
1 pricing and gladly cooperated in founding the Tokyo Sailing Ship
l Company in 1880. When it proved insufficient competition for
(.'
C:
Kobe and Yokohama dropped from 55.5 to @.25 in two years. The
supporters of Iwasaki 
and Shibusawa carried 
on smear campaigns 
against
both men while 
both com anies 
exhausted themselves 
B 1885
I Shibusawa was proposing that the government step in to regulate
lcompetition. But meanwhile, with his easy access to bank capital,
'Iwasaki secretly bought up over half the stock of United Transport,
Heliminating Shibusawa's influence in this business.
There are many examples of this kind. They all point out how,
while the decision to move industry into private hands was undoubtedly
'the correct one, the government might have been more judicious about
ito whom it sold the businesses. .The sold enterprises came with built-
1Iin advantages (monopoly in the domestic market, start-up inefficiencieE
ialready absorbed), and the great merchant buyers had another advantage
S (easy access to cheap bank capital), The result was the gradual
concentration of economic power and control in a few hands, although
the goal of rapid industrial expansion was indeed ' met. The Japanese
ueconomy more or less adjusted to this structure, but the political
62
Mitsubishi, other smaller firms were added, to form the United
Transport Company. In 1881 Mitsubishi's protector in the government
was ousted, and the government added substantially to United's
capital. In the fierce competition that followed fares between
_
(i
repercussions were profound. The heavy industries already depended
on armament orders; the country was generally militaristic in outlook
by long tradition; and the successes in the Sino- and Russo-Japanese
:1 _
!militarism has been discussed at length in many other studies.
The fourth part of Meiji fiscal policy was a h17h level of ex!
,penditure for import of western technicians and the sending abroad of
i Japanese students and government officials. China, with its tradi-
tional ethnocentric attitudes, completely failed in this area untili !
it was too late.
As the following tables show, a very sizeable proportion of the
I [I
budget of the Ministry of Industry was spent to hire foreign techni-
Icians. Most were English or German, and were employed chiefly in
Imake its businesses models of western efficiency before selling them
inumber of foreigners employed declined rapidly after 1i80, even before
nmost of the enterprises had been sold (p. 56) because enough
Japanese had returned from study abroad to fill the need.
The government sent more officials abroad than students Many
of these officials were military officers. But technology was just
beginning to play an important role in military affairs in the latter
bupart of the nineteenth century, so their foreign training was not
confined to tacticses. In time most of t h e developments around the
Sworld in hydraulic machinery and metallurgy were being made inJapan ese had returned from study abroad to fill theaneed. werearmamf these official were military officers. But technology was just
it
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SALARY PAID TO FOREIGN EMPLOYEES IN THE
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY
Year Min- Rail-
ing road
3.2
14.6
27.7
30.6
31.9
75J1
111.2
96.5
100.9
68.7
40.9
49.9
44.o
46.3
37.5
13.5
2.5
32. 9
106.7
172,8
231.2
289.3
278.8
234.0
143.1
114.9
95.3
84.1
66.6
59.5
52.7
50.1
49.5
* including Other
** ratio to total
Tele- Light- Mach-
graph house inery
.2
3.0
16.7
46.4
57.8
65.2
67.3
70.2
66.1
66.0
45.3
31.2
16.8
13.0
13.0
11.4
11,2
1.2
30.7
58.8
69.7
'72.2
77.2
74.8
88.8
74.1
66.9
51.4
40.4
20.5
9.2
6.8
.6
30.2
41.7
55.2
68.2
80.5
34.1
30.8
32.1
27.0
35.9
37.9
31.9
23.9
29.8
29.1
20.3
8.5
Build'g School Tot.
of Tech. *
14.8
8.3
8.7
12.3
14.5
17.7
18.1
5.5
4.8
4.8
2.0
2.5
14.6
58.7
42.3
44.5
54.9
63.8
60.7
61.7
60.7
44.9
28.7
22.6
22.2
22.2
46.6
87.3
177.8
294.6.
438.8
534.4
628.8
616.5
570.0457.2
386.5
342.4
282.8
219.1
179.6
127.6
96.7
82.9
Ratio
to **
31.
31.9
63.4
39.2
27.7
56.1
56.3
66.6
51.6
48.2
44.1
41.7
33.0
24.7
17.2
16.9
Ministry of Industry expenditure
FOREIGN EMPLOYEES BY NATIONALITY
1876-1885
Germany
U.S.A.
France
China (ch'ing)
Italy
Holland
Austria
Other
1247
313
274
263
102
61
1886-1895
969
312
309
97
64
64
Source: Koichi Emi - Government Fiscal Activity and
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1978
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
U.K.
Total %
1716 43.8
625 16,0
583 14.9
360 9.2
166 4.2
125 3.2
100 2.6
55 1.4
185 4.7
Economic Growth in
Japan 18 68-19 6 9; Tokyo, Kinokuniya Bookstore Co.
Ltd., 1963
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GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE REQUIRED TO ADOPT MODERN TECHNIQUES (Y mil.)
Total payment
to foreign
employees
Expenses for
Officials &
Students sent
abroad
Total Total Exp.
in Ordinary
Account of
Government
Official Student
3160
7906
3774
2577
2522
992
327
726
1018
929
543
375
582
213
365
4695
8608
5082
3808
3916
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN EDUCATION
Educational
Expenses by
Ministry of
Education
2.3
7.4
4.5
5.1
6,7
9.0
26.4
32.4
34.2
Educational
Expenses in
Central
Government
2.8
9.7
7.4
5.8
7.6
10.3
29 .8
38.5
56.5
Total
Expenditure
in Central
Government
148.4
388.0
329- 3
383.6
403,6
640 .6
1322.8
2014.1
2917.4
79,316
322,163
293,105
310,165
321,717
(Y mil.)
% of C.G.
Total
1.88%y
2.50
2.24
i.51
1.88
1.60
2.25
1.91
1.95
iSource: Koichi
13-68-72
1873-77
1878-82
i 1883-87
! 1888-92
II
I!
1368-72
1373-77
1878-82
1883-87
1888-92
1893-97
1998-1902
1903-07
1908-12
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pulsory. Attendance rose to 90%. (6) Widespread formal schooling
was also made necessary by the promulgationof the promised republican
Constitution in 1889; a literate population can still be manipulated,
but an illiterate population is much more easily mislead.
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able to learn the latest techniques, which were then applicable to a
wide variety of industries when they returned home.
In domestic education the government made a committment to
universal public education, which improved the nation's capacity
to absorb foreign technology and eventually to develop their own.
By 1890 50% of all young children had organized schools available to
them, and in 1908 six years' schooling was made both free and con-
iv
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!RunIG TRAD POfm .UIuI
Foreign trade had been forbidden under the
Shogunate. There had even been a ban on the
building of large ships. With the entry of the
westerners in the 1850's foreign trade began,
usually centered around each of the local han, i
whose chief interest was in acquiring weapons.
When the Meiji came to power they banned all
such local trade, and forced trade to proceed
through government-supervised channels. This
effor + as onl^+! 1ial uccfl in 1h1
CI
FI
of foreign specie to help stabilize the
currency by means of loan's•eB- Japinae.eXeporýer
repayable only in foreign specie. The Bank
also undertook the inspection for quality of
cargoes leaving Japan. The government also
promoted foreign trade by agressive advertising
of Japanese products abroad, establishment of
many consulates, trade fairs and exhibitions,
and so forth.
Foreign trade, indeed all foreign contact, had been banned for
centuries under the Shogunate. There were even laws against the
building of ships over a certain tonnage. This was one reason why
Japan lagged greatly in technology; many of the western advances in
heavy machinery had been made, in the shipbuilding industry, partic-
ularly the navy.
when the treaty ports were first set up In the i:bU's, tne
reformers who later became the Meiji government denounced the
Tokugawa regime as traitors to their country. But as the overwhelminE
I1
.1t
beginning, but became more workable when the
Yokahama specie bank and other organizations
were set up to carry on foreign exchange in an
organized manner. The Yokahama specie bank
was the instrument for implementing a major
aspect of Matsukata's-policy: the acquisition j ii i
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superiority of the westerners became clear, the future Meijiii
leaders pragmatically adopted the course of approving foreign trade,
Swith hopes of using it to their own advan'.age.
This advantage did not begin to materialize until after 1880, IH
and Japan did not regain full tariff autonomy until 1911. The
Meiji tried very early to secure return of autonomy diplomatically,
with a series of embassies in 1871; the western nationa all refused.
ISo other measures had to be taken. Dealings by local governments,
which had been the Tokugawa pattern, were forbidden. Tsushoshi
I (trade offices) were established at every port in 1869 to control
i foreign trade, but these had to be abandoned in 1871. They were
(
(
I~II
subsequently revived. During this same time the government actively
organized .large firm of merchants with Mitsui Hachiroemon at its
head. This was a joint-stock company, similar to and probably
modelled on the European East India Companies that frequented
Japanese ports. It was most important for Japanese merchants to
ý t h i it l A A t 4- thý - 1-A
pu eLL rcp L a LU Vg e oJ ve th neqessr VW Lt.y ;sIze:V LIU coJmpIIet 6e
with the west; the government had much more success in fostering
joint-stock companies in this area of the economy than in industry.
This "Trade Association" was the first company system Japan imported
from the west,'
Other such trade firms arose, and 6ackhtetfdedto cohotrol trade
in its home port, limiting access to terchants affiliated with the
firm. The government seized on these firms as a means of controlling
!
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AMOUNT OF FOREIGN TRADE
(,000 b )
Year
11868
ii~870
1871
1872
1873
'1874
H1175
1876
1877
S1878
1879
1880
S1881
111882
1i883
111384
I11885
186
Total
*26,246
33,692
48,284
39,885
43,201
49,742
42,779
43,586
51,676
50,769
58,862
61,128
65,021
62,250
67,169
64,712
63,.5L44
66,503
81,044
96,711
-- "
· · ·- · l-·--·CIII~----·-LM
Exports
S15,553
12,909
14,543
17,968
17,026
21,635
19,317
18,611
27,711
23,348
25,988
28,175
28,395
31,059
37,722
36,268
33,871
37,146
48,876
52,4071-987
fSR
Imports
10,693
20,783
33,741
21,917
26,175
28,107
23,462
29,975
23,965
27,421
32,874
32,953
36,626
31,191
29,447
28,444
29,673
29,357
32,168
44,304
Balanc
4,860
-7,874
-19,198
-3,949
-9,149
-6,472
-4,145
-11,364
3,746
-4,073
-6, 986
-4,778
-8,231
-132
'8,i 27.5
7,824
4,198
7,789
16,708
8,103
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ce: Shibusawa Keizo
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ij 65,455
66, 104
81,729
62,927
71,326
88,257
117,481
129,260
171,674
219,300
277,502
220,401
287,261
250
3,956
-25,125
16,600
19,776
1,455
-4,235
6,851
-53,831
-56,165
-111,748
-5,472
-82,831
65,705
70,060
56,603
79,527
91,102
89,712
113,246
136,112
117,842
163,135
165,753
214,929
204,429
- Japanese
Tokyo, Obunsha, 1958
131,160
136,164
138,332
142,9454
162,428
177,970
230,728
265,372
289,517
382,435
443,255
435,331
491,691
i 1889
'11890
11891
1892
t1893
18 94
i1895
1i 896
V 1897
1899
1900
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YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK(,0ooo )
Year
Source: Financial and
l
Economical Annual of Japan, #11 (1902)
Tokyo, Government Printing Office
Deposits
Amt. Trans. Balance
24,171 3,187
45,702 4,014
51,428 "3,849
78,477 13,742
118,789 20,829
147,804 16,564
119,474 17,473
103,846 12,758
120,624 15,472
84,539 7,143
93,362 4,732
76,704 5,532
94,800 2,743
114,915 6,422
239,241 11,002
322,413 13,051
556,037 18,186
673,454 36,134
.R81
1882
11883
1884
1885
9186
11887
i1888
1889
j1890
1892
48q93
11804
1895
1896
1897
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Bills Discounted
Amt. Trans. Balance
454 88
1,163 1.29
308 20
361 19
1,739 338
2,956 637
8,735 1,515
38,311 2,008
59,037 591
33,935 438
42,901 2,126
44,617 2,433
50,301 1,407
52,530 2,397
72,100 2,957
82,301 4,286
154,719 6,034
197,841 9,314
4.
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foreign trade. For example, in Osaka the local government published
decrees that anyone who wanted to engage in foreign trade there had
to join the company. But these efforts at presenting a strong
front through a few large companies bogged down before foreign
pressure and complaints of non-member merchants. The regulations
had to be relaxed.
In 1975 Okubo Toshimichi presented a motion to the government.
Since Japan opened her ports to foreign trade,
all the trade rights have been in the hands of the for-
eigners, so that Japanese traders have been under their
sway. Some Japanese traders rose from the position of
obscurity to big business, but none of them have been
able to compete with foreign traders, by whose hands
the trade rights are monopolized. This failure of
Japanese traders may be explained by the facts that
Japanese traders lack knowledge of foreign trade and
their capital is too limited. Under the circumstances
the best way to promote Japanese foreign trade is
to make Japanese traders ship their export goods direct.
ly to foreign lands by their own hands. (1)
This kind of direct export would mean recovery of trade rights from
foreigners. This idea was not put into practice for another five .
years. The continuing drain of specie, and its effect on the currenc3
finally alerted the government to. bgin a new program.
In 1880 Matsukata established the Yokahama Specie Bank, whose
principal functions were to discount and exchange foreign currency
and to make loans to Japanese exporters. Such loans were made with
money accumulated in the Reserve Fund mentioned previously, a result
of Matsukata's deflation program. A stipulation of these loans was
(1) Shibusawa Keizo, op. cit., p. 482
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consulates were established in European ports. Consular staffs
actively investigated local market conditions. They conducted
trial sales of Japanese goods and advised the home merchants of the
results. The Kansho-kyoku (Bureau for the Encouragement of Commerce)
began regular publications on foreign markets.
Japan also participated enthusiastically in international fairs
t nat they De repala on thne conclusion of tne voyage in thne oreign
specie earned on that voyage. In this way Matsukata was able to
both encourage direct export, taking some economic power away from
the foreigners, and also to accumulate the specie needed to
stabilize the monetary system. The tables clearly show a pronounced
shift in the balance of payments following the deflation and the
founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank.
To trade abroad effectively, Japan also needed quality goods
desired in the west, and knowledge of western markets. The previous
chapter showed how industries were fostered. Quality control was
added to the functions of the Yokahama Specie Bank. Since it was
by far the largest financier of exports, it was in a position to
examine many of the cargoes. Whatever was not up to standard was not
allowed to leave.
The government took a direct role in providing knowledge about
foreign markets. Consulates were set up in San Francisco (1870),
Shanghai, New York, and Foochou (1872), Amoy, Tientsin, and Honolulu
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Among them were fairs at Vienna and London (both 1873), ~Melbourne
(1875). and PhiladelDhia (1976). The largest effort was at the Parisil
fair of 1978.
I As with heavy industry, the government took the initiative in
advertising Japanese 7goods abroad and promoting exports, where
Sprivate capital and experience were either slow or deficient. The
I aim (or at any rate, the result) in industry was to create small
but modern businesses with sheltered markets, ripe for take-over and
I expansion by private owners. The government assumed the start-up
risk. In foreign trade, the government assumed the risk arid expense f1
of acquiring knowledge and introducing products, even though this
was certainly a drain on resources that could have gone into A
capital construction. In this way private trade was able (willing?)
Ii
i to follow more rapidly than if the merchants had to bear all the risk
themselves.ii!!
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The whole point of studying past events is to gain insight
into present and future situations. A final question thus arises.
What lessons might be drawn from the success of Japanese industriali-l
zation that could be applied to other developing countries today?
Obviously, many economic circumstances are not the same today, j
The world is not on the gold/silver standard. Militarily-enforced
imperialism is no longer in vogue,although economic imperialism
still exists. Few, if any, countries possess the set of economic I
and social conditions mentioned in chapter two, particularly the
willingness to copy what is superior in other cultures.
But many LDC's do possess some of the key elements of the
Japanese success. Nationalism and opposit;ion to foreign encroachment
-int 
frin nra
is strong in LDC's, and many of them are just developing money
economies in the rural areas - a fortuitous circumstance for Japan.
Most of them have better natural resources than Japan, but smaller
populations.
One lesson seems to be that governments should not try to
develop free markets on the western model in the beginning. Free
markets and the price system lead to small, duplicative, inefficient
industries that cannot compete with foreign firms. The Japanese
deliberately created large,monopolistic national markets, thus
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spreading the available capital over a number of key industries. It
was deemed more important to develop technolocy first, and worry about
free competition later. Where LDC's are too small to develop
Sefficient national markets, the regional market may be an answer.
In the Andean Common Market, efforts are underway to assign the
development of particular industries to particular countries, thus
avoiding duplication throughout the region
The role of the government should be to bear the risk and
Sprovide the initial capital in areas where private sources are
reluctant or inexnerienced. It was not necessary that the Japanese
state enterprises run at a profit. The valuable result, whether
deliberate or not, was to introduce machinery and techniques and.
OWNERS
establish a sheltered market. Then private could take over and
are then loaned out for industrial expansion. if the money entersti i eratethe market foear consumer goods an DC government undesir ablpparently get awaSare then loaned out for industrial expansion. If the money enters
will result.
The Japanese used periods of deliberate deflation to great
advantage: to consolidate the currency, shift labor forces, and firm-
up foreign trade. LDC's have a tendency to try to keep expanding,
delaying eventual deflation either to later generations or until
- ----.---.-----..---... - il.------- - __ .11-
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some catastrophe occurs. They might do well to imitate the
successful use of defaltion by the Japanese.
Encouragement of direct exporting was very important for the
SJapanese, for it took away some of the foreigners' bite and brought
Sin needed foreign specie. Many LDC's should find this policy easy
to follow, since they often possess mineral resources needed in the
developed countries. But the Japanese experience shows that this
policy works best when the government bears the risk of introducing
new products, expDori ng market conditions, etc.
In general, the successFul efforts of the Meiji government
were preuicated on the assumption of risk by the government, followed!
by rapid private expansion of the industries once the uncertainty
had been reduced. The nrivate merchant houses stood to lose for-
tunes if they undertook such ventures from the start. But "risk"
and "loss" do not have the same meaning for governments. Unlike a H
private fortune, a government's "fortune" is not fixed rigidly; it
Sis limited only by the tax base. If government industries incurr
S ilosses during the risky start-uip period, the losses can be replaced
with new taxes, bonds, etc. The private merchant does not have this
flexibility. The concept of government businesses does not sit
well with American notions of free markets, but it certainly acceler-
ated Japanese development. It is the author's opinion that free
markets work best in develoned economies, and that the idelistic H
I imposition of a free-market system on an underdeveloped economy may
i ji
actually retard growth. The only problem is to keep open a
mechinism for freeing the markets when the level of development is
appropriate. This the Meiji did 4hot flly iucceedo.in doing, and
the result was increasing agressive militarism.
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